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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction in the district 
court. This court has jurisdiction as this is the original appeal 
from a district court conviction. Defendant was convicted by a 
jury on a lesser included second degree felony and a third degree 
felony. The Defendant was sentenced 0-5 years at the State Prison 
after the second degree felony was reduced pursuant to a 402 
motion. No sentence was imposed on the third degree felony because 
the court found both charges resulted from a single criminal 
episode. The Defendant was acquitted of all other charges. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Does the newly discovered evidence warrant a new trial? 
2. Should the court have given the lesser included 
instruction on communications fraud to obtain something other than 
something of monetary value? 
3. Should the court have given both the communications fraud 
instruction for something other than for value and the unlawful 
acts of a director instruction? 
4. Should the court have required the State to prove an 
affirmative grant of authority by Mountain Oil to establish the 
Defendant as an agent? 
5. Should the court have allowed the prosecutor to extend "on 
or about October 21, 1986" back over the years to 1979? 
6. Should the court have given Defendants instruction on 
proof beyond "any" reasonable doubt? 
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IMPORTANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Statutes: 
UCA 76-1-402(3) 
UCA 76-10-706 
UCA 76-10-1801 
The relevant portions of the foregoing statutes are quoted 
within the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case. The Defendant was originally charged 
with three counts: communications fraud, a first degree felony; 
theft, a second degree felony; and unlawful acts of a director, a 
third degree felony. 
After a trial to a jury the Defendant was found guilty of 
unlawful acts of a director, a third degree felony and a lesser 
included offense communications fraud a second degree felony. The 
Defendant was acquitted of all other charges. 
The Defendant was a clerk for Mountain Oil Company. He was so 
employed from September, 1961 until the fall of 1986. There were 
no job descriptions or policy manuals or memos of procedures. 
(Transcript Volume IV page 683.) The Defendant was never an 
officer or director of Mountain Oil. (Transcript Volume IV page 
685.) 
Paul Callister was the president of Mountain Oil. Jan 
Callister was the secretary/treasurer. Robert Dalton was the vice-
president/executive manager. The Callisters and their family, 
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owned Mountain Oil as a minor part of their oil business holdings. 
They were absentee owners and managers. Robert Dalton was the day 
to day operations officer in charge.(Transcript Volume I page 120 
and page 143.) 
In 1981 the method of paying gasoline taxes changed for 
Mountain Oil. In that same year there was a gas leak at the Ogden 
plant that saw a loss of 40,000 gallons of gasoline that washed 
into the sewers of west Ogden. The Mountain Oil management covered 
up the leak including the loss of inventory to prevent the EPA from 
determining the source of the contamination. (Transcript Volume IV 
page 696.) 
As a result of all of these problems and others at the end of 
the year, the Mountain Oil accountant, Don Murphy and Mr. Becker 
differed in balances of $221,000. This was not lost money but 
errors in accounts payable and inventory. Mr. Becker found 
$140,000 of the error over the next few months. The other $70,000 
in misidentified inventory or accounts payable he was sure would 
turn up eventually. (Transcript Volume IV page 694 to page 696.) 
Mr. Becker from that time until May of 1986 did not reconcile 
the check book but estimated the balances accounting for the 
$70,000. (Transcript Volume IV page 692 line 16.) Robert Dalton 
had complete authority in the company to make whatever decisions he 
desired including borrowing $100,000 to ease cash problems. 
(Transcript Volume I page 164.) 
Dalton developed health problems and became a heavy drinker. 
Dalton also ceased carrying on his daily responsibilities including 
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the monitoring of inventories. (Transcript Volume IV page 704 line 
5 to line 14.) Dalton never established any inventory controls. 
There was no way of knowing the inventory. The Defendant estimated 
the inventories when Dalton ceased to do them. (Transcript Volume 
IV page 712 line 8 to line 22.) Robert Dalton was the Defendant's 
immediate supervisor and boss. He reported the problems to him. 
(Transcript Volume IV page 706 line 13 ff.) 
After deregulation the oil business became very tight. There 
was an extreme cash crunch as margins and volumes shrank. Robert 
Dalton was aware of the problems and would not report to the 
Callisters for a cash infusion, but instead opted to borrow from a 
local bank to try and solve the cash flow problem. (Transcript 
Volume IV page 701.) As the cash crunch increased Mr. Becker would 
write checks to creditors including various taxing agencies and 
send them when there was money to whom ever was yelling the 
loudest. (Transcript Volume IV page 701.) 
The other clerical staff reported that they saw Dalton reach 
in and take cash periodically from the cash drawer. John Becker 
only saw this on two occasions. (Transcript Volume I page 168.) 
They were times he was informed that Dalton was traveling with the 
Callisters. Becker did not know what arrangement Dalton had with 
the Callisters. (Transcript Volume I page 169.) 
In November of 1986 John Becker went to Paul Callister and 
told him he could not work under the conditions he was. He 
informed of the $221,000 error in the accounting and that he had 
found $140,000 of it. He also informed him that no one was running 
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the company, especially Dalton. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. A new trial is warranted because of newly discovered 
evidence. 
a. The prosecutor entered a plea arrangement with a co-
defendant to purchase testimony against the Defendant. That 
arrangement was not revealed to the Defendant. 
b. The principal witnesses against the Defendant entered 
a settlement agreement relieving each other of substantial 
financial liability the day before the trial. That arrangement was 
known to the prosecutor and was not disclosed to the Defendant. 
c. It appears that the foregoing information was 
intentionally kept from the Defendant. 
2. The communications fraud described in UCA 76-10-1801 (e) 
is not a lesser included offense of UCA 76-10-1801 (f). 
a. The State requested the lesser included offense over 
the objection of the Defendant. 
b. The instruction given by the court requires the proof 
of additional elements. 
3. Communications fraud as defined in Jury Instruction No. 11 
contains the identical elements as the charge of bad acts of a 
director defined in Jury Instruction No. 16 as found by the jury. 
a. The Defendant was entitled to have only the lesser 
charge go to the jury. 
b. The instructions were confusing and used the same 
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words with different meanings to describe potentially different 
crimes. 
4. The court erred in not requiring the prosecutor to prove 
a grant of authority to specifically create an agency. 
a. The court failed to define the key term in defining 
agent, "authorized to act." 
b. The court confused the jury by using respondeat 
superior language in some of its definitions. 
5. The court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue that 
"on or about" covered years and even decades. 
a. The communication fraud is alleged to have occurred 
on October 21f 1986. 
b. No communication by the Defendant took place on 
October 21, 1986. 
c. The prosecutor was able to argue and use in evidence 
every alleged communication of a decade prior. 
6. The court erred in not allowing the Defendant's requested 
instruction of reasonable doubt. 
a. The Defendant requested that the standard be defined 
as proof beyond any reasonable doubt. 
b. There is danger of confusion in the juries mind of 
proof beyond a (singular) doubt and proof beyond "any" reasonable 
doubt, especially in a complex case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED BECAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE 
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The newly discovered evidence in the present case is two fold. 
Mountain Oil Company, Paul Callister individually, Jan Callister 
individually and Robert Dalton executed a document dated April 4th, 
1989 entitled "Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release." (See 
District Court file # 891919454 page 171 to 176.) 
Robert Dalton misrepresented his plea bargain on the stand. 
The prosecutor failed to correct Dalton's false representation. 
Paul Callister and Jan Callister failed to disclose their deal with 
Dalton. Their deal led to the Callisters avoiding substantial 
individual tax liability. 
The prosecutor failed to correct the Callisters' misleading 
statement or disclose to the defense the inducements and financial 
considerations between the State's principal witnesses. 
The Supreme Court has recently taken up the issue of new 
trials in the case of State v. Worthen, (Utah 1988) 765 P.2d 839. 
The Court gave its interpretation of Rule 24 of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure found in UCA 77-35-24 which states in sub-
paragraph (a), 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own 
initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there 
is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect 
upon the rights of a party. 
The Worthen Court gave a synopsis of the existing law. A new 
trial is justified if the newly discovered evidence clarifies a 
fact that was contested and resolved against the movant. (State v. 
Cooper, 201 P.2d 769.) Or the new evidence may have changed the 
outcome of the trial. (State v. Swain, 541 P.2d 5.) Generally, 
impeachment testimony is not enough. (State v. Brown, 48 Ut 279.) 
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For impeachment evidence to be the basis of a new trial the 
evidence must have direct bearing on the issues at trial. The 
impeachment evidence must be such that it would be helpful to the 
jury in determining the facts of the case. 
POINT TWO 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO KNOW OF THE FINANCIAL DEAL 
BETWEEN THE STATE'S PRIMARY WITNESSES AND DALTON'S PLEA BARGAIN 
The State is under an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory 
or potentially exculpatory information to the Defendant. This is 
an affirmative obligation even if there is no Brady request. In 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d at 662, the Utah Court stated "due 
process requires a prosecutor to disclose even unrequested 
information which is or may be exculpatory." 
In the present case the Defendant filed two separate discovery 
requests and a bill of particulars. A request was made for 
exculpatory information as well as all statements of Robert Dalton. 
In Worthen the Court stated that the Brady obligation is 
affirmative and ongoing. 
Mr. Dalton was questioned by Counsel concerning his plea 
bargain and its terms. Neither Dalton nor the prosecutor disclosed 
at trial or in response to Defendants discovery requests that 
Dalton had cut a deal with Paul Callister, Jan Callister and 
Mountain Oil Company to free Dalton from financial claims by the 
Callisters. (See District Court file # 891919454 page 171 to 176.) 
Dalton was released by the Callisters individually and by Mt. Oil 
of all liability claimed in Bankruptcy cases 88A-00699 and 88C-
06067. Additionally Dalton was released from liability under a 
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civil action filed in the Second Judicial District for Weber County 
Civil No. 99316 by the Callisters. 
This agreement was signed April 4th, 1989, immediately prior 
to the commencement of John Becker's trial. Even though the 
document was executed before Becker's trial the Callister's 
attorneys did not mail it to the individuals requiring notice in 
the bankruptcy actions, one of whom was John Becker, until April 
21, 1989, after Becker's trial. (See District Court file # 
891919454 pages 180, 181 and 183.) 
The prosecutor was aware of the details of the arrangements 
between Dalton and the Callisters. (See Dalton sentencing 
transcript page 13 at District Court file # 891919454 page 185.) 
The prosecutor never revealed he had cut a bargain for Dalton's 
testimony that required the State to acquiesce in 402 treatment of 
Dalton, thus allowing him to escape at the end of probation with 
only a class B misdemeanor. 
The treatment of Mr. Dalton at sentencing is equally 
extraordinary and should have been revealed. It appears that the 
plea was made in a manner to prevent the Defendant from being 
present. Mr. Dalton plead to his charges the day before the trial 
of Mr. Becker. Mr. Dalton did not plead on a regular law and 
motion calendar but at a hurriedly arranged appointment. Mr. 
Dalton was sentenced or rather granted 402 treatment after the 
trial of Mr. Becker. 
Sentence was not imposed meaning that the charges will become 
misdemeanors in due course. The prosecutor recommended to Adult 
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Probation and Parole that "he not serve any jail time, not one 
day." (District Court file # 891919454 page 186 line 14-16). The 
Court imposed a thirty day jail sentence with work release. The 
State further agreed to a restitution figure to be set between 
$9,000 and $14,000, a far cry from the hundreds of thousands 
claimed against Dalton in the civil actions. (District Court file 
# 891919454 page 187 lines 17-21.) 
The State agreed to remain silent at the time of sentencing 
acquiescing in the sentence requested by Dalton. (See Dalton 
sentencing transcript page 27.) Such an agreement was not revealed 
by Mr. Dalton on the stand. (Transcript Vol. Ill page 516 line 21 
through page 518.) Mr. Dalton when specifically asked what the 
plea bargain arrangement was stated the deal was: 
1) the two major charges would be reduced to third degree 
felonies; 
2) the theft charge would be dropped; 
3) he would be sentenced only on one charge; 
4) he would testify against Becker. 
Even if the information was not intentionally withheld from 
the Defendant the effect was the same. Dalton's false description 
of the payment for his testimony was not corrected by the 
prosecutor. The jury had a right to know of the heavy inducements 
offered to Mr. Dalton to comport his testimony with that of the 
Callisters. 
Paul Callister upon being questioned by Counsel, as to his 
financial interest in putting the blame on Becker and avoiding tax 
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liability never divulged he had released Dalton from all past, 
present and future, known and unknown liabilities. (District Court 
file # 891919454 page 175) 
The only witnesses against the Defendant, on the vital issues 
of the charges the jury returned guilty verdicts, were Mr. Dalton 
and the two Callisters. The Defendant and the jury had a right to 
know that those witnesses were in collusion, trading financial 
inducements involving the prosecutor in plea arrangements the day 
before the trial of John Becker in order to attempt to fix blame on 
Mr. Becker and name him a scapegoat. 
It is inconceivable that nothing was mentioned of these 
transactions and the plea arrangement. These men negotiated 
immediately before they testified against the Defendant, The State 
was a party to these negotiations as evidenced by the plea bargain 
with Dalton. The prosecutor was aware of the whole agreement as he 
heard it recited by Dalton's attorney at his entry of plea the day 
before Becker's trial began. (Dalton sentencing transcript page 12 
& 13 at District Court file # 891919454 page 184 line 22 to page 
185 line 13.) 
The withholding of this vital information from the Defendant 
represents a denial of due process. Concealing the financial 
benefits derived from a conviction of the Defendant by the three 
major witnesses is unconscionable. No legitimate purpose was 
served by the withholding of this information. 
The Callisters and Dalton were the only individuals who 
testified that Becker was a director of Mountain oil even though 
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all of the documentary evidence admitted at trial was to the 
contrary. 
The credibility of these witnesses would have been severely 
compromised had Defense Counsel been able to make the jury aware of 
the financial agreement between these individuals. Especially when 
this agreement was reduced to writing the day before trial. It 
seems apparent there has been an affirmative effort to prevent the 
defense from having this information prior to trial. 
a) Dalton's change of plea was scheduled at a special time. 
b) Callisters' attorneys held the agreement and mailed it to 
the bankruptcy matrix, which includes John Becker, only after 
Becker's trial was finished. 
c) The prosecutor did not correct Dalton's false statement as 
to the plea bargain he had made. 
d) Neither of the Callisters revealed their financial deal 
with Dalton for his testimony. 
Mr. Becker is entitled to a new trial. The credibility of the 
witnesses against him is devastated in light of the compromises 
that have been made to secure Mr. Dalton's testimony and to cover 
up the Callisters' own financial advantage from a conviction. The 
jury found Mr. Becker not guilty on all three theft charges. The 
convictions entered were only on the charges that involved the 
direct testimony of the Callisters and Dalton. The Defendant had 
a right to make the jury aware of the financial deal going on 
between the primary witnesses and the State as the trial began. 
The Defendant had an absolute right to know of the arrangement. 
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The knowledge that the principal witnesses against the 
Defendant had so much to gain from a conviction of the Defendant 
and that they had affirmatively cut financial deals to that end is 
powerful exculpatory evidence. It is this very kind of evidence 
Defendant's discovery requests were aimed at uncovering, (District 
Court file # 891919454 page 5 and 47,), the very evidence the 
prosecutor chose to coverup. 
POINT THREE 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD ON WHICH THE JURY CONVICTED THE 
DEFENDANT IS NOT A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS 
FRAUD CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN 
OVER DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS. 
UCA 76-1-402 defines the types of offenses that my be charged 
as lesser included offenses. There are only three statutorily 
defined ways a charge may have lesser included offenses. 
a) It is established by proof of the same or a less than 
all of the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged; or 
b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, 
or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an 
offense otherwise included therein; or 
c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a 
lesser included offense. 
The second and third descriptions are not relevant to this 
case. UCA 76-10-1801 does not designate by statutory mandate any 
lesser included offenses. The legislature has been plain in 
declaring their intent in identifying lesser included offenses. 
For comparison see UCA 76-5-201 (2) defining criminal homicide. 
It is equally obvious that the lesser included given by the 
Court is not an attempt or some other form of preparation to commit 
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the charged offense. 
The case law requires a two fold test under paragraph (a): 
1. The trial court must first decide whether the offense is 
established by proof of the same or fewer than all of the elements 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged. 
2. The court must consider the evidence to determine whether 
the greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific 
variations of the crimes actually proved at trial. State v. Young, 
780 p.2d 1233 (Sup Ct 1989.) State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221 (1986). 
A stricter standard applies when the State requests a lesser 
included, than when the Defendant requests a lesser included 
instruction. In this case the Defendant objected to the lesser 
included instructions. (Transcript Volume IV page 799 Line 5 to 
line 10.) Then both the legal elements and the actual evidence or 
inferences needed to demonstrate those elements must necessarily be 
included within the original offense charged. An instruction on 
the lesser offense should be given at the prosecution's request 
only if the greater offense could not be committed without also 
committing the lesser offense. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 
(1986). 
UCA 76-10-1801 provides a neat scheme of classification in 
ascending order from a class B misdemeanor when the money or 
property involved has a value of less than $100.00 to a first 
degree felony for property obtained in excess of $100,000.00. The 
glaring exception is in paragraph (e) which makes it a second 
degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud 
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is other than money or something of value. 
This creates the difficulty of having two second degree 
felonies within the classification scheme. The test of whether 
this is a lesser included offense is, "does the crime on which the 
jury convicted require proof of less than all of the facts required 
by the charge in the information?" The answer is a resounding nol 
It requires the proof of additional facts. 
The sub-paragraphs of section 1801 are easy to compare and the 
differences become readily apparent when they are laid out side by 
side with (f) and (d) in proper descending order and (e) laterally 
placed as it should logically be. 
(f) a first degree felony 
when the value of the property, 
money or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is 
$100,000 or more. 
(d) a second decree felony (e) a second degree felony when 
when the value of the property, the object of the scheme or 
money or thing obtained or artifice is other than the 
sought to be obtained is more obtaining of something of 
than $10,000 but does not monetary value, 
exceed $100,000. 
The amount of money that is alleged to have been taken is the 
variable element between the charge in the information and all of 
the subparagraphs of 1801 except subparagraph (e). 
It is easy to understand how if the state failed to prove a 
fraud of $100,000 they may still have by a lesser proof proved 
$10,000 or each successive lesser amount down to $100. 
Sub-paragraph (e) however does not flow from a lesser proof. 
It requires the proof of a separate element, namely the proof of an 
object of the fraud of something other than something of value. It 
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is not a lesser proof but the proof of a different element. 
An analogy may be made to the different categories of theft. 
The degree of the crime depends on the value of the property taken. 
However, sub-paragraph (e) would be like throwing robbery in as a 
lesser included of theft. The crimes are related, even similar but 
at least one additional element is required of each crime. 
A Venn diagram is helpful. Imagine a circle containing all of 
the items of property with a value from $1.00 to over $100,000. If 
the circumference of the circle contains all values up to and 
including over $100,000 then any value less than $100,00 will 
occupy a smaller circle wholly contained within the original large 
circle. All of the lesser values of property that may be proved 
are within the circle and therefore are lesser and included. The 
facts to prove something "without monetary value are outside of the 
circle and therefore are neither lesser nor included. 
The facts that would constitute proof of sub-paragraph (e) are 
not merely a failure to prove sub-paragraph (f) but are a different 
set of facts altogether. Sub-paragraph (e) does not flow down from 
the original charge containing sub-paragraph (f). It is over to 
the side of the diagram, outside of the circle. It is not lesser 
and it is not included. The legislature's intent to make sub-
paragraph (e) a lateral related crime is apparent because it made 
two second degree felonies in the classification structure. 
The facts of the present case do not support the inclusion of 
sub-paragraph (e) . There was no evidence offered as to what the 
other object of the scheme or artifice to defraud may have been. 
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Even the prosecutor could not come up with some object other than 
something of value. In describing this instruction the prosecutor 
said: 
then it's a communications fraud in the second degree because 
his objective is to obtain something other than monetary value. 
What that is I don't know, but if that's what you conclude, that he 
wasn't getting any money, then it becomes a second degree 
communications fraud. (Transcript Volume V at page 907 line 14 to 
18. emphasis added) 
Inclusion of sub-paragraph (e) of section 1801 allows the jury 
to do just what the prosecutor asked them to do speculate wildly 
about a possible objective. 
Instruction No. 11 (See District Court file # 891919454 page 
104) should not have been given. It is not a lesser included 
offense of the offense charged. It does not meet the test set out 
in UCA 76-1-402. The instruction does not meet the requirements 
set forth in State V. Young or State v. Hansen. 
The prejudice suffered by the Defendant is that he is required 
to defend against what is essentially a new charge. It is 
confusing to the jury. It allows the jury to resort to 
speculation. The matter is compounded by the prosecutor's call in 
closing argument for them to speculate as to the object of any 
scheme if it was not money. No evidence was received for anything 
other than the allegation that the Defendant was taking money or 
was an accomplice with someone else receiving money. 
The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 11. 
POINT FOUR 
THE CRIME OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD ON WHICH THE JURY FOUND THE 
DEFENDANT GUILTY, AS DEFINED IN JURY INSTRUCTION 11 CONTAINS THE 
SAME IDENTICAL ELEMENTS AS THE CRIME THE JURY CONVICTED THE 
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DEFENDANT OF COMMITTING AS DEFINED IN INSTRUCTION 16. 
The crime of "Communications Fraud" and the crime of "Unlawful 
Acts of a Director" appear on their face to require different 
elements. In the present case, however, the elements as 
necessarily found by the jury make the elements identical. The 
findings of the jury are contained in the various verdicts they 
rendered. 
The material elements of " Communications Fraud" defined in 
Instruction 11 of the jury instructions are: 
3) devised a scheme or artifice, 
4) for the purpose of: 
a) defrauding another; or 
b) to obtain from another money, property, or anything of 
of value. 
5) by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions; and 
6) on or about October 21, 1986, 
7) communicated directly or indirectly with any person by any 
means for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice; 
8) the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other 
that the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
The evidence mustered to support the third element alleging a 
"scheme or artifice" was the allegation that the Defendant "made 
false entries in books, reports or statements of the corporation." 
As a necessary and explicitly argued portion of the State's case 
the scheme or artifice was a "director, officer or agent" 
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authorized to act making false entries in books, reports or 
statements of the corporation. 
The fourth element has two disjunctive possibilities. The 
first is the Defendant intended "to obtain from another money, 
property, or anything of value." The jury found this branch of the 
disjunctive to be not true. The Defendant was acquitted of all 
charges involving theft or taking either for himself or as an 
accomplice for Robert Dalton. The jury necessarily and 
specifically found the Defendant did not receive anything of 
monetary value under three separate verdicts. 
The fifth element requires the Defendant "by false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions" carried out the purpose of element four. The false acts 
claimed by the State are the false entries in the books, reports or 
statements of the corporation. 
The time element requiring the events of the communications 
fraud to have occurred on October 21, 1986 was expanded by the 
Court over the objections of the Defendant to allow an 
interpretation that the events of the communication tracked back 
over earlier time periods as alleged in the "Unlawful Acts of a 
Director" charge. 
Element seven requires a communication. The only 
communication alleged by the State is the claimed false entries 
into the books and records. There was no evidence of any other 
communication, nor was any other communication alleged. 
The eighth element in the lesser included "Communications 
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Fraud" substitutes an intent to defraud for some purpose other than 
the obtaining of money. As found by the jury, this element is the 
same as "with the intent to injure or defraud the corporation." 
The scheme or artifice to defraud argued by the State is in 
its essence the making of false entries in books and reports by a 
"director, officer, or agent" of the corporation. 
The State in order to prove the "Communications Fraud" has 
relied upon an agent with an intent to injure making false entries. 
There is no additional element required by the "Communications 
Fraud." The "scheme or artifice" argued by the State was the 
Defendant as a "director, officer or agent" made false entries in 
the corporation's books. 
This may be illustrated graphically as follows: 
ELEMENTS OF 
"COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD" 
a scheme 3) devised 
artifice, 
or 
4) for the purpose of: 
a) defrauding another; or 
b) to obtain from another 
money, property, or anything of 
value. 
5) by means of false or 
fraudulent p r e t e n s e s , 
representations, promises, or 
material omissions; and 
6) on or about October 21, 
1986, 
7) communicated directly or 
indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of 
ELEMENTS OF 
"ACTS OF DIRECTOR OR AGENT" 
2) as a director, officer or 
agent of a corporation; 3) made 
false entries in books... 
4) with the intent to injure or 
defraud the corporation. 
Found not guilty of this 
element. 
3) made false entries in books, 
reports or statements of the 
corporation; 
Court over objection allowed 
State to argue longer time 
period. 
3) made false entries in books, 
reports or statements of the 
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executing the scheme or corporation, 
artifice; 
8) the object of the scheme or 4) with the intent to injure or 
artifice to defraud is other defraud, 
than the obtaining of something 
of monetary value. 
The aiding and abetting element is identical for each 
instruction. Even though the two differing crimes may have 
differing elements in the abstract the elements found in this case 
by this jury are identical. 
The lesser included instruction on "communications fraud" for 
something other than for value did not belong in this case. It was 
given over the objection of the Defendant. (Transcript Volume IV 
Pages 781, 795 and at Volume V at page 909.) The introduction of 
this charge invariably led to the confusion that the jury made 
manifest in its verdict. 
The Defendant was prejudiced by both charges being given by 
instruction to the jury. The verdicts the jury returned reinforce 
the conclusion they were confused by the instructions. A different 
result likely would have been reached without the inclusion of the 
lesser included charges. 
POINT FIVE 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 16 AND 17. 
These instructions deal with the elements of the crime of 
unlawful acts by a director, officer or agent and the definition of 
director and agent. 
The court defined director in Instruction No. 17 as "any of 
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the persons having by law direction or management of the affairs of 
a corporation, by whatever name the persons are described in its 
charter or known by law." (See District Court file # 891919454 page 
111). 
In Instruction No. 18 (See District Court file # 891919454 
page 112) the court quotes the code that a person cannot be a 
director without his consent. There is no evidence that John 
Becker was ever elected or appointed a director of Mountain Oil. 
Paul Callister's testimony was to the effect John Becker was 
elected a director December 4, 1979. The minutes for that meeting 
(Exhibit No. 10) show a gift of one share of stock to Becker 
because of long time service to the company. (Transcript Volume I 
page 116 to 123.) 
Mr. Callister finally admits that there was never an 
acceptance by Mr. Becker, never an election or an appointment of 
mr. Becker that is recorded in any set of minutes or any filing 
with the State of Utah. 
Jan Callister was the secretary/treasurer of the company and 
kept the minutes of the directors meetings and shareholders 
meetings from the late 1960 's. (Transcript Volume II page 206 line 
24 to page 207 line 13 and Volume I page 120 line 12 to line 18.) 
There are no minutes of any meeting in which John Becker was made 
a director. (Transcript Volume II page 205 line 18 to page 206 line 
2.) There are however, minutes when Jan Callister and Robert 
Dalton were all made directors. (Transcript Volume II page 206 
line 3 to line 23.) 
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There is no evidence of John Becker being a director except 
the verbal statements of Paul Callister that are belied by the 
minutes of the actual meetings kept by his brother, Jan Callister. 
Likewise there is no evidence that heard that John Becker was 
an officer of the corporation. The president was Paul Callister, 
the vice-president/general manager was Robert Dalton and the 
secretary/treasurer was Jan Callister. No evidence was ever 
offered that John Becker was anything other than a bookkeeper. 
The issue centers on the definition of agent. The court 
defined agent in Instruction No. 17 as "any director, officer, or 
other person authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or 
association." 
The Defendant objected to this definition and argued for a 
definition that required the corporation to bestow or create the 
agency by some act. The court accepted the defense argument that 
mere employment does not constitute agency. (Transcript Volume IV 
page 799.) 
Agency requires an act of creation. In the typical case the 
principal endows the agent with the authority to act. The 
legislature has required many agency relations to be in writing; 
insurance sales, UCA 31A-23-309; corporate process agent UCA 16-10-
11; durable power of attorney, UCA 75-5-501. 
An employee is not automatically an agent of a corporation. 
In the present case this is very clear. Mr. Becker was an employee 
for a company that had no job description for him other than 
bookkeeper. There were no policy or procedure manuals and no 
26 
memo's outlining on going policies. (Transcript Volume I page 130 
line 16 to page 131 line 23.) Mr. Becker never signed for the 
company on any corporate resolution or obligation. (Transcript 
Volume I page 121 line 20 to page 122 line 4.) 
To claim that Mr. Becker is an agent of the company there must 
be some designation of his agency. The principal must some how 
constitute him as an agent. The Defendant was entitled to an 
instruction that affirmatively required the State to prove that the 
Defendant was constituted as an agent. 
The only person in the Ogden office of Mountain Oil that was 
constituted as an agent to act for the company was Robert Dalton. 
(Transcript Volume I page 129 line 9 to line 15.) 
The usual situation involving principal and agent is where 
someone is trying to hold the principal for the acts of the agent. 
In this case it is the reverse. 
UCA 7-2-201 and 204 are the source of confusion. These 
sections represent the usual situation where the principal is 
sought for the acts of the agent. Agent of a corporation is 
defined "any director, officer, employee or other person 
authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association." (UCA 
76-2-201 (1)) The court recognized this definition applied only in 
part, however, the court failed to expound on the key term of 
"authorized to act." The court failed to require the State to 
prove the grant of authority. 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO ARGUE THE TERM "ON OR 
ABOUT" MEANING MONTHS AND EVEN YEARS. 
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The communications fraud charge and the lesser included on 
which the jury returned a guilty verdict specify that the crime 
took place on the 21st day of October, 1986. (See District Court 
file # 891919454 page 66.) No verbal communication was introduced 
into evidence that the Defendant made on that day. (See Exhibit 
Seven; Minutes of the Director's meeting for October 21, 1986.) 
The State relied exclusively on Exhibit Six, the "Mountain Oil 
Company Balance Sheet and Income Statement, for August 1986" as 
the communication. 
The claimed communication is this financial statement for 
August of 1986 that was presented at the director's meeting held on 
October 21, 1986. Mr. Becker is not listed as a director but as 
Mothers" present. 
Mr. Becker did not directly contribute information to the 
August, 1986 financial statement. The actual financial statement 
was prepared and generated by Don Murphy. Under cross examination 
Murphy admitted that Becker didn't communicate any of the actual 
figures. Murphy further admitted that each of the items reported 
in the August financial statement came from Becker's books from 
May, which were the last figures he provided. Murphy admitted the 
May figures were substantially correct. (Transcript Volume I Page 
298 line 21 to page 315 line 18.) 
The end result is there were no communications made by John 
Becker on October 21, 1986 as alleged in the information. 
Defendant moved to dismiss this charge and the others at the end of 
the State's case. The court denied the Defendant's motion. 
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(Transcript Volume III page 488 to page 513.) 
The issue was renewed in jury instructions. The prosecutor 
was allowed to add "on or about to the instruction." (Transcript 
Volume IV page 781 line 18 to line 23.) The prosecutor was allowed 
to argue that the communications did not have to occur on October 
21, 1986 but could have occurred for years before. (Transcript 
Volume IV pages 783 to 785.) 
The essence of the court's position is to allow the prosecutor 
to argue that on or about October 21, 1986, means not only a 
financial statement made in September, a reconciliation statement 
made in May, but all of such statements made for years before. 
(Transcript Volume V page 814 to page 817.) 
What communication was made on October 21, 1986, was requested 
in the Bill of Particulars. The prosecutor answered by only saying 
the August financial was the communication. (See District Court 
file # 891919454 page 37). 
The prosecutor admitted separate communications are separate 
charges when he said, 
As to alleging one date, I think the statute specifically 
provides that each separate communication should be a separate 
charge. Now, I guess we could have alleged a separate charge 
— 50 different charges — or 24 different charges for each 
financial statement that was prepared over that two year 
period ...(Transcript Volume III page 498 line 1 to line 6.) 
The court by allowing the prosecutor to argue all of the prior 
financials as communications culminating in the August statement 
has allowed him to argue prior claimed bad acts as proof of the 
present charge. It also allows the major element namely a 
communication to go without proof on the day charged. 
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The Defendant has been prejudiced. The court has allowed 
prior alleged communications to be used in proof of the 
communication element in the information on the date charged. The 
statute, 1801 clearly provides that each communication is a 
separate charge. There would be multiple criminal episodes. One 
for each financial, each requiring its own trial. The court has 
allowed the evidence of all allegations to be used to expand the 
"on or about language to cover years. 
The Utah appellate courts have allowed "on or about" to mean 
one day off, two days off, even four days off, but not a decade. 
State v. Hill, supra. 
If the prosecutor were required to allege each communication 
as a separate count each communication could be examined on its 
merits. The court has allowed alleged communications from the late 
70's and early 80's to be considered. (Transcript Volume II page 
297.) If the charges were brought properly the Defendant would 
have defenses of to each of them including asserting the statute of 
limitations. As the court allowed the prosecutor to lump all of 
these into one date of October 21, 1986, regardless of when the 
actual communication was claimed to have been made, the Defendant 
is severely prejudiced. 
It is improper and unjust to allow the prosecutor to allege a 
date on which a communication occurred and then prove that date by 
showing any alleged prior bad communication for a decade before. 
POINT SEVEN 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT INCLUDING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT 
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The court refused to include language in the reasonable doubt 
instruction requiring proof beyond any reasonable doubt. 
(Transcript Volume IV page 800 line 19 to line 24.) A jury may 
well be confused whether it must find proof beyond a (singular) 
reasonable doubt or if its duty is to find proof beyond any and all 
reasonable doubts. 
In a complex case with complex elements that apply differently 
to different charges, it is vital for jurors to know the standard 
of proof is beyond any and all reasonable doubts. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant seeks to have his conviction over turned and the 
charges dismissed or in the alternative a new trial granted. This 
is a case that involves a small company that has been allowed to 
drift without real management for years. The officers in an 
attempt to fix blame and avoid personal tax and other liability 
have attempted to find a scape goat. All of the results of years 
of poor management are being laid at the Defendant's door. John 
Becker is being charged because he did not go over the head of 
Robert Dalton, his immediate boss and report Dalton to Paul 
Callister. The Defendant is entitled to a new trial armed with the 
collusions of the primary witnesses against him and a properly 
instructed jury. / 
Respectfully submitted, 
Donald Cr hughes, JrV^l^^ 
Attorney for Defend^iit/Respondent 
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